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ABSTRACT  
This contribution develops two objections to Hans Lindahl’s legal philosophy, as exhibited in 
his Authority and the Globalization of Inclusion and Exclusion. First, his conception of constit-
uent power overstates the necessity of violence in initiating collective action. Second, his rejec-
tion of the distinction between participatory and representative democracy on the grounds that 
participation is representation is misleading, and compromises our ability to differentiate quali-
tatively among various forms of (purportedly) democratic involvement. Both problems stem 
from the same root. They result from conflating two distinct senses of ‘representation’: acting-
for-someone (or representative agency) and portraying-something-as-something (or representa-
tion-as). 
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“Representation” is perhaps the master concept of Hans Lindahl’s imposingly 
rigorous and massively erudite book, Authority and the Globalization of Inclusion 
and Exclusion.1 Lindahl conceives of legal order as a specific form of collective ac-
tion (IACA, or “institutionalized and authoritatively mediated collective action”). 
Because, Lindahl argues, collectivities only exist in being represented—to say ‘we’ 
is to represent a multitude as a unity—law also is essentially representational. 
Moreover, a legal system operates by representing space, time, subjects, and ac-
tions as ordered in some particular way. Last but not least, Lindahl regards his 
own task as a matter of representing law in a particular way, namely as essentially a 
 
1 Hans Lindahl, Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclusion (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2018). All in-text page numbers refer to this work.  
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specific form of collective action. At each of these levels of analysis, the book con-
cerns the politics of representation because Lindahl argues that representation in-
evitably operates by including and excluding (in a complex, dynamic way: includ-
ing also what is excluded and excluding what is included), and he seeks to come to 
terms with the fundamental contestability that follows from this.  
I find much to learn and little to disagree with in Lindahl’s conception of law, 
including the role of representation therein. My critical remarks focus on two ar-
guments that Lindahl advances which are perhaps tangential to legal theory, but 
pertinent to political theory. The first claim is about the nature of collective action: 
it essentially involves violence. This has to do with Lindahl’s view of constituent 
power. The second claim concerns democracy. Lindahl maintains that the distinc-
tion between participatory and representative democracy is specious because all 
democracy involves representation. Both claims, I will argue, are problematic. 
The first leads to an overly bellicose view of collective action, which obscures the 
possibility of constituent power in the mode of invitation. And the second com-
promises our ability to distinguish qualitatively among various forms of (purport-
edly) democratic involvement. Moreover, I’ll try to show that the cause of both 
problems is the same: they result from conflating two distinct senses of ‘represen-
tation’: acting-for-someone (or representative agency) and portraying-something-as-
something (or representation-as). Lindahl’s analysis of representation in the sense 
of portrayal is more careful and sophisticated than much of the literature on rep-
resentation in political theory that I am familiar with, particularly in attending to 
the dynamics of representing-something-as-something, But if the ‘as’ tends to gets 
lost in contemporary political theory, it seems to me that Lindahl makes the op-
posite mistake of treating this particular sense of the word (portraying-something-
as-something) as the only sense there is.  
  
1. REMARKS ON ‘REPRESENTATION’ 
Let me start with a reminder: many languages have various words that translate 
as ‘representation’ in English. This speaks to the polysemy of representation: the 
word has multiple meanings. Two senses are crucial in the present context: the 
sense of acting-for-someone in the capacity of a representative, as an MP might 
represent a constituency or a lawyer a client (vertegenwoordigen in Dutch and ver-
treten in German), and the sense in which a picture might represent something: 
portraying-something-as-something (voorstellen and darstellen). Call the former 
representative agency, and the latter portrayal or representation-as. Both are polit-
ically salient. At an abstract level, both senses involve rendering present in some 
sense what is also absent. But it is important not to conflate them.  
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These senses don’t just come apart semantically, but also logically. When we 
speak of representative roles, such as when an MP is said to be the representative 
of her constituency, or the government of “the people”, the posited relation of 
representation is dyadic: x represents y. But to speak of a picture as portraying 
something in one way or another is to posit a triadic relation: x represents y as z. 
This is true also for discursive representation-as, e.g. “the MP portrays the plan as 
being contrary to the public interest”.2  
Recognizing the triadic structure of representation-as is vital to understanding 
the dynamics (and politics) of portrayal. What is represented as thus-and-so can 
always be represented differently. This is also central to Lindahl’s analysis: “Rep-
resentation always discloses something as this, rather than as that, which entails 
that it is not possible to include without excluding” (6). This brings out the crucial 
“difference between the interpreted and the interpretation” “between something 
and its disclosure as something” (7). Likewise any particular representation-as can 
be taken to be about this, or instead about that. Any portrayal is subject to inter-
pretation, and therefore contestable, both with respect to what it is a representa-
tion of (its referent) and what it is represented as—how it is characterized. 
We fully agree about representation-as, I believe. But in my view, Lindahl is 
too hasty to claim that all representation is to be understood along these lines: 
“representation is indissolubly representation of (something) and representation as 
(this or that)” (109). This overextends his insightful analysis, and misses the dyadic 
structure of relations of representative agency: if I call someone a representative of 
some constituency, I posit a relation with two terms. It makes no sense to call 
someone the “representative” of her constituency as thus-and-so. Of course the 
representative may represent her constituency as having such-and-such interests, 
but so may a journalist. We have now switched back to the sense of portrayal. It 
may be true that the sense of representation-as is ontologically more fundamental 
than representative agency, in that the roles of representative and constituent de-
pend on being portrayed. But that does not entail that, conceptually speaking, rep-
resenting, in the sense of acting-for-someone, can be reduced to representing in 
the sense of portraying (representing-as).  
 
2. CONSTITUENT POWER: IMPOSITION OR INVITATION?   
With this in the back of our minds, let’s turn to the first claim I wish to discuss, 
which is about the form of power that animates collective action. Lindahl argues 
 
2 I develop this point and some implications for theoretical disputes about representative de-
mocracy and constituent power in my “Constructivism and the Logic of Political Representation”, 
American Political Science Review 113, no.3 (2019): 824-837. 
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that law is a specific form of collective action, and collective action draws on and is 
sustained by a certain form of power: constituent (or constituting) power—the 
power through which groups or collectives are brought into being, as opposed to 
the constituted power of an established collective. On Lindahl’s conception, con-
stituent power operates essentially through a kind of dissimulated annexation. An-
nexation, because Lindahl holds that all collective action stems from a moment of 
illicit appropriation, a taking or seizure. Someone has to take the initiative to say 
“we” in order to institute—to represent—“us” as a collective. Insofar as the initiative 
succeeds, the addressees are swept up into a collective, and this ineluctably carries 
an element of violence. This moment of violence is then veiled because in order 
to succeed the initiatory act must present itself as legitimate. And in legitimating it-
self, Lindahl believes, it must appeal to the collective agent that it seeks to bring 
about. The initiator thus initiates while pretending that the initiative has already 
taken place.  
Lindahl sees this bootstrapping conundrum as characteristic of all collective ac-
tion (and consequently all law): a collective must, but cannot, authorize its own ini-
tiation. “Representation deploys a paradox: a foundational act of inclusion and ex-
clusion can only originate a putative collective unity to the extent that it succeeds 
in representing an original unity” (292). The radical implication Lindahl draws is 
that violence is at the root of all collective action, hence all law: “To call attention 
to the moment of seizure inherent to representation is to insist that violence, even 
if a productive (but never only productive) violence, is necessarily ensconced in all 
legal orders” (181).  
Is it true that all collective action, by definition, rests on dissimulated annexa-
tion? This is no doubt a common, perhaps pervasive, mode of constituent power. 
But is it true as a matter of conceptual necessity? We need to carefully examine 
the sense or senses of representation involved.  
It seems to me there are two distinct ideas running through Lindahl’s argu-
ment: a thought about collective ontology and a normative claim about authoriza-
tion. The first is a basic insight about the mode of existence of collectives: that 
they exist in being portrayed. The key idea, as Raf Geenens et alia have put the 
point, is that a group “needs to be represented as a collectivity in order for it to be 
a collectivity.”3 To speak of a people is to portray a multiplicity of individuals as a 
unity. The sense of representation involved here is representation-as. This, I take 
it, is the point Lindahl is making when he says, for example: “A collective, i.e. the 
unity implied in we* together, is always a represented unity, a unity that is only 
given indirectly (as this or as that), regardless of whether the collective has two, 2 
billion or more participants” (109).  
 
3 Raf Geenens, Thomas Decreus, Femmy Thewissen, Antoon Braeckman, and Marta Resmini, 
“The ‘Co-Originality’ of Constituent Power and Representation,” Constellations 22, no. 4 (2015): 
515. 
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The second thought about representation in Lindahl’s account of constituent 
power concerns the question: what entitles someone to be considered a repre-
sentative? To genuinely speak or act on behalf of someone requires some kind of 
authorization. This is the sense he invokes in instances such as this: “[B]ecause a 
we* cannot say ‘we’, the collective on whose behalf someone first speaks and acts 
cannot have authorised the initiative in advance.” (181) (The asterisk marks the 
first-person plural standpoint of the collective in question.4) Clearly, the sense of 
representation at stake here is representative agency.  
The crux of Lindahl’s account of constituent power seems to be this: Lindahl 
believes that someone who seeks to initiate a collective—who makes a representa-
tional claim in the first sense, portraying a multitude as a unity—must necessarily 
claim the role of a representative of that collective in the second sense. This is 
what generates a legitimation gap, in cases where the collective appealed to does 
not yet exist. For it seems reasonable to insist that for authorization to occur, the 
authorizer must exist. Hence the apparent paradox at the heart of constituent 
power. This is clear in the following passage:  
“Yet, whoever seizes the initiative to act on behalf of a we* presupposes that there 
is a bounded we* that needs representation. Who occupies the we* speaker posi-
tion claims to act on behalf of [emphasis added] the broader group of participants—
the we* at stake—that is already deemed to exist [emphasis added] and for whose 
sake its authorities rule by articulating, monitoring and upholding the point of joint 
action. So even the first closure that includes and excludes claims that a closure has 
taken place (literally) in the past, hence that the first closure is no more than a resto-
ration of an earlier closure, the boundaries of which may be nebulous but not ef-
faced. [...] [T]he taking that founds a collective must claim to operate a retaking, the 
legal re-foundation of a collective.” (288-289) 
Is it true that an initiatory moment of portrayal is also, ipso facto, a moment of 
representative agency? I do not see why that would be so. A we* need not come 
into being because someone says “we” on its behalf. I can say “we” on my behalf, 
as the putative member of a we* to be. That is what an invitation is all about (“let 
us...”). When Peter says: “Shall we discuss Hans’ new book in Hamburg?”, he 
does not have to pretend that the collective he alludes to already exists, as a 
bounded whole. He has to imagine, and ask his addressees to imagine, a collective 
that could come into existence, and that would come into existence (and include 
himself and the addressees) as a result of appropriate uptake—a sufficient number 
of addressees accepting his invitation. This involves representation in the sense of 
portrayal.  
The crux of the story is how we interpret the “re-” of representation. Notice 
Lindahl’s chronological interpretation, in the passage just quoted, of the “re-” pre-
 
4 Here Lindahl draws on a seminal article by Bert van Roermund: “First–Person Plural Legisla-
ture: Political Reflexivity and Representation,” Philosophical Explorations 6, no. 3 (2003): 235–50. 
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fix: what is represented is “already deemed to exist”; its founding is supposed to 
have “taken place (literally) in the past”. This is what generates the paradox, for 
what is deemed to exist already before an act is supposed to be brought into exist-
ence through that very act. The chronological interpretation makes sense on the 
assumption that the sense of representation in question is representative agency. 
But here, the pertinent sense is that of portrayal. And in that case, the chronologi-
cal reading of the “re-” prefix is too restrictive. Note again the triadic structure of 
representation-as: x (subject) represents y (referent) as z (characterization). A rep-
resentational object denotes something and characterizes it in some specific way 
(e.g. a multitude as a unity). What it denotes, the referent, must be logically prior 
to being represented in the object. But the priority need not be chronological; it 
does not have to exist before it is invoked in representation. All that is required is 
that one can refer to it. And we can refer to all sorts of things that do not or do not 
yet exist—imaginary things, things that will or could come to exist, things that exist-
ed in the past. When Peter issues his invitation, he posits a collective that is as yet 
counterfactual, and that becomes determinate (i.e. comes to denote a specific set 
of individuals) only by invitees accepting his invitation and turning up. This sug-
gests: the initiative cannot be seized but must be granted; there is no taking without 
partaking. 
Does Peter not pretend to act on behalf of the ‘we’ that he seeks to constitute? 
I do not see why we cannot say that Peter acts of his own accord, as a putative 
member of the we* to be. Of course, he must assume the standing to invite. But 
this standing does not derive from the we* he seeks to constitute. It is also true 
that an invitation usually comes unasked, may sometimes be impertinent, and you 
cannot un-invite yourself. But you can ignore or refuse an invitation. And when 
you do, if it is genuinely an invitation, that’s the end of it. If there is a profound 
paradox here, I do not see it.  
So it is true that “acts of representation [that initiate collectives] are always 
premature and depend on follow-up by those to whom they are addressed.” But 
that is not because they “have not and cannot have been authorised in advance by 
the collective that is represented” (110). Rather it is because uptake by address-
ees—accepting or rejecting the invitation—is constitutive of whether the portrayal 
finds a referent (and which referent, exactly).  
In short, the idea that constituent power is essentially a moment of seizure 
turns on conflating two different senses of representation. A collective is brought 
into being through portrayal (and its uptake), not necessarily through representa-
tive agency. Lindahl’s account obscures the different comportments one might 
adopt in taking an initiative. When collectivities arise by means of force and vio-
lence, this is not because imposition is “inherent to representation” but because 
power is employed in the mode of imposition rather than invitation.  
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3. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: NO TAUTOLOGY  
The same conflation of representative agency and representation-as is behind 
Lindahl’s remarks about democracy. Lindahl claims that all democracy is essen-
tially representative democracy, joining a “representative turn” among democratic 
theorists who contest the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” democracy, 
or between “participation” and “representation”. 5 Lindahl formulates the point 
thus:  
“In effect, the well-known distinction between direct and indirect democracy, be-
tween participative and representative democracy, is specious: participation is a form 
of representation in the twofold sense of representation of a collective and its repre-
sentation as this or that unity. [...] Institutionally speaking, parliaments are one of the 
possible ways of staging representation, but by no means the only one.” (109)  
It is true that democracy cannot do without representation. But we have to be 
careful to specify in what sense, exactly. No democratic politics can do without 
portraying things in various ways: e.g. the people as a unity, the common interest 
as being such-and-such, the referendum-outcome as expressing (or failing to ex-
press) what “the people” want, and so on. I agree that the opposition between “di-
rect” and “indirect” democracy is a simplification, one that is dangerous if it is tak-
en to mean that the “will of the people” can ever be present in an unmediated 
way, without being represented, contestably, as this or as that.  
It is not true, on the other hand, that democracy by conceptual necessity re-
quires that some set of people make decisions on behalf of the rest, in the special 
role of representatives, as distinct from ordinary members, of the collective. And 
that sense of representation as acting-for-others, institutionalized by means of elec-
tions, is what “representative democracy” ordinarily means. Understood in this 
sense, the distinction between representation and participation is not specious. 
There is a qualitative difference between making a decision or expressing an opin-
ion (representing one’s own views as being thus-and-so, if you will), on the one 
hand, and relying on someone else to do so for you. This is precisely the contrast 
Hannah Arendt seeks to draw in On Revolution, when she compares revolution-
ary councils with political parties. The former aspired to manifest “the equality of 
those who had committed themselves to, and now were engaged in, a joint enter-
prise.”6 The latter, in contrast, turned on a division of roles between ordinary citi-
zens and their representatives: “Even if there is communication between repre-
sentative and voter, between the nation and parliament […] this communication is 
never between equals but between those who aspire to govern and those who con-
 
5 See, for example, Sofia Näsström, “Where Is the Representative Turn Going?,” European 
Journal of Political Theory 10, no. 4 (2011): 501–10.  
6 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 1990): 278. 
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sent to be governed.”7 Lindahl obscures the difference between these modes of 
political involvement when he argues against Arendt that “it is a misconception to 
characterize the conflict between the two by asserting that ‘the issue at stake [is] 
representation versus action and participation.” (110)8  
In short: all democracy may be representational, in that it involves practices of 
portraying the will of the people as this or that, but not all democracy is by defini-
tion representative democracy, in that some persons are considered representative 
agents of others.  
 
7 Ibid.: 276.  
8 Quoting ibid.: 273. 
